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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A REMEDY FOR LEGISLATIVE
MALAPPORTIONMENT
By declining to reach the merits in Baker v. Carr,' the Supreme
Court avoided a decision as to which judicial remedy, if any, could be
applied to correct an unconstitutionally apportioned state legisla-
ture.2 A recent district court decision in Hearne v. Smylie3 intimates
that there is no appropriate form of judicial relief and, thus, that a
decision on the constitutional merits is precluded.4
As a consequence of Baker, the court in Hearne was compelled to
accept jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claim of unconstitutional ap-
portionment.5 However, the majority argued that since it could not
affirmatively reapportion the Idaho legislature, 6 elections under the
present scheme could not be enjoined without depriving the people
of a de jure government in violation of the guaranty clause of the
United States Constitution. 7 Thus, the action was dismissed without
consideration of the constitutional merits because, among other
reasons,8 of the asserted inability to grant relief.
' 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2 "[I]t is improper now to consider what remedy would be most appropriate if
appellants prevail at the trial." 369 U.S. at 198.
225 F. Supp. 645 (D. Idaho 1964).
In federal courts, a case may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted." FED. R. Crv. P. 12 (b), (d).
r225 F. Supp. at 648. At the time Hearne was filed, 17% of the voting population
could elect a majority of the Idaho senate, and 33% could elect a majority of the
house of representatives. Since the Idaho constitution requires every county to
have at least one representative in each house, the disparity in district population
ranged from 915 to 93,460 in the senate, and 915 to 16,719 in the house. 52 NAT'L
Civic REv. 97 (1963). In Caesar v. Williams, the state supreme court refused to
consider the constitutionality of this apportionment. 84 Idaho 254, 371 P.2d 241
(1962) (3-2 decision).
0 225 F. Supp. at 655.
7Id. at 651, 655-56. "The United States shall guarantee to every State... a Re-
publican Form of Government ...." U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
8 The majority cited two other reasons for dismissing the suit. First, it was urged
that there are no constitutional standards to determine whether Idaho's legislative
apportionment violates the fourteenth amendment. 225 F. Supp. at 650-51. Secondly,
under the doctrine of equitable abstention, a federal court "should decline to interfere
in the State process" until plaintiffs' claim is adjudicated by the courts. Id. at 652.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet decided the issue of constitutional
standards for a state legislature, no other federal court has refused on this ground to
proceed to the constitutional merits. See, e.g., Daniel v. Davis, 220 F. Supp. 601, 605
(E.D. La. 1963); Germano v. Kerner, 220 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Lisco v. Love,
219 F. Supp. 922 (D. Colo. 1963); Sobel v. Adams, 214 F. Supp. 811, 812 (S.D. Fla. 1963);
W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Toombs v. Fortson, 205
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Standing in direct contrast to the Hearne decision are three cases
in which district courts have already imposed judicial reapportion-
ment in their respective states.9 Various other courts have expressed
their duty to do likewise if the legislature should fail to enact cor-
rective measures within a reasonable period.10
It would appear safe to assume, moreover, that the power of the
judiciary to grant relief in reapportionment cases is not an issue
dividing the present Supreme Court. In Baker, the majority
opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan stressed the Court's confidence that
F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962); See McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reappor-
tionment and Equal Protection, 61 MIcH. L. Rav. 645, 659-700 (1963); Comment, 72
YALE L.J. 968, 970-1029 (1963). The Court in Baker stated that "judicial standards
under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar .... ... 369 U.S.
at 226.
On the other hand, the question of deferring to the state court process raises an
unresolved problem in the context of legislative reapportionment. The better view
would seem to be that abstention is not required. Compare Mann v. Davis, 213
F. Supp. 577, 585 (E.D. Va. 1962), and Toombs v. Fortson, supra at 253, with Lein v.
Sathre, 201 F. Supp. 535 (D.N.D. 1962), approved, Lein v. Sathre, 205 F. Supp.
536 (D.N.D. 1962). See generally 1964 Duaa LJ. 155.
The dissenting opinion in Hearne tacitly stated that none of the majority's reasons
justified judicial dismissal of a "problem touching such a fundamental right as that
of legislative representation." 225 F. Supp. at 656.
9 Baker v. Carr, 222 F. Supp. 684, 694 (M.D. Tenn. 1963); Moss v. Burkhardt, 220
F. Supp. 149, 155 (W.D. Okla. 1963), 49 VA. L. REv. 1209; Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp.
431, 441-42 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
20 Davis v. Synhorst, 225 F. Supp. 689, 694 (S.D. Iowa 1964); Sincock v. Duffy, 215
F. Supp. 169, 190-92 (D. Del. 1963); Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577, 585-86 (E.D. Va.
1962); Thigpen v. Meyers, 211 F. Supp. 826, 832 (W.D. Wash. 1962); League of Neb.
Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189, 196 (D. Neb. 1962); Wisconsin v. Zimmerman,
209 F. Supp. 183, 188 (W.D. Wis. 1962); Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 248, 259 (N.D.
Ga. 1962).
In Nolan v. Rhodes, the district court held that judicial relief would be precluded
in Ohio because the electorate could alter the existing apportionment by popular
initiative and referendum. 218 F. Supp. 953, 958-59 (S.D. Ohio 1963); see Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 258-59 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring). In Nolan, however, the
court found the legislative apportionment constitutional; hence the question of relief
was moot. The better view would seem to be that since the referendum is a costly,
cumbersome, and time-consuming process, realistically it is not an effective remedy.
League of Neb. Municipalities v. Marsh, supra at 192-93; Dixon, Apportionment
Standards and Judicial Power, 38 NoTm DAME LAW. 367, 372 (1963); Emerson,
Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 YATE L.J. 64, 70 (1962); Sindler, Baker v.
Carr. How to Sear the Conscience of Legislators, 72 YALE LJ. 23, 32 (1962); cf. Davis
v. Synhorst, 217 F. Supp. 492, 499-500 (S.D. Iowa 1963). But see McCloskey, Foreword:
The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARv. L. Rav. 54, 73-74 (1962). Furthermore, even an
apportionment adopted by a majority of the voters may be unconstitutional. Scholle
v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962).
Although generally more reluctant to act than federal courts, state courts have also
recognized a duty to grant relief in reapportionment cases. See, e.g., Scholle v. Hare,
supra; Mikell v. Rousseau, 123 Vt. 139, 183 A.2d 817, 822-23 (1962). One state judiciary
has decided the constitutional merits despite an inability to grant relief. Sweeney v.
Notte, 183 A.2d 296, 303 (RI. 1962).
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district courts would be able to fashion relief if violations of constitu-
tional rights were found." Indeed, the Court's finding of justicia-
bility and jurisdiction over the subject matter would seem to dispose
of any doubts as to the existence of an appropriate remedy.12 This
conclusion was explicitly affirmed in the concurring opinions of
Justices Douglas13 and Clark. 4 Even Mr. Justice Harlan, who
dissented in Baker, has unequivocally stated that if a violation of the
fourteenth amendment exists, it is the duty of federal courts to
vindicate the constitutional right.' 5 Therefore, it is clear that fed-
eral courts have equitable power to grant relief, and contrary to
Hearne, the unresolved issue is a matter of determining which
judicial remedy is "appropriate" to correct legislative malapportion-
ment.
A judicial remedy should be forthcoming once legislators have
manifested their inability or unwillingness to reapportion according
to the requirements of the fourteenth amendment.'6 It is agreed
that the initial form of action is to enjoin future elections under the
"1369 U.S. at 198.
12 d. at 198-204, 208-37. In Baker the Court held that a malapportionment suit
does present a justiciable claim; the majority opinion stated that one test of justicia-
bility is to determine "whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially
molded." Id. at 198. Jurisdiction of the subject matter was found to exist under the
Constitution and under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3); this latter provision grants original jurisdic-
tion to district courts "to redress the deprivation, under color of any State law ... of
any right... secured by the Constitution .... " (Emphasis added.) The entire tenor
of the majority opinion was summarized in the statement: "The right asserted is
within the reach of judicial protection under the Fourteenth Amendment." 369 U.S.
at 237.
11Id. at 245-50. Mr. Justice Douglas felt that relief could be "fashioned in the
light of well-known principles of equity." Id. at 250. Although several examples
were cited, most deal with the problem of equitable abstention and not affirmative
judicial action. Id. at 250 n.5.
21 Id. at 251, 258-60. Mr. Justice Clark stressed the argument that if the federal
courts were incompetent to grant relief, the case would have been properly dismissed
without a decision on the constitutional merits.
1 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3190 (Nov. 26, 1963). This statement was made by Mr. Justice
Harlan in response to oral argument that Baker merely created a "right without a
remedy." The other dissenter in Baker, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, is no longer on
the Court.
" Under the theory of equitable abstention, every district court to date has initially
stayed relief for a "reasonable period" to enable the legislature to reapportion itself.
See, e.g., Davis v. Synhorst, 217 F. Supp. 492, 504 (S.D. Iowa 1963); Thigpen v. Meyers,
211 F. Supp. 826, 832 (W.D. Wash. 1962); Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577, 585 (E.D.
Va. 1962); Comment, supra note 8, at 1030-35. But in many cases, legislative coopera-
tion will be destined to failure because, in the words of Mr. Justice Clark, "the
majority of the voters have been caught up in a legislative strait jacket." Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 259 (1962).
Vol. 1964: 611]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
invalid scheme.17 Hearne logically submits, however, that a pro-
hibitive injunction of this nature is an incomplete remedy."' Con-
tinued legislative inaction would leave the state without the con-
stitutional means of selecting its representatives. To comply with
the mandate of Baker v. Carr it is therefore necessary that federal
courts have at their disposal an affirmative remedy to supplement
the injunction.19
However, the need for affirmative judicial relief should not auto-
matically legitimize every alternative suggested to the courts.20  An
"appropriate" remedy2' must be presumed to imply one that is
constitutionally within the competence of federal courts,2 2 as well as
one which is reasonably adapted to the practical considerations28 of
the representative process.
In determining whether a remedy is within the competence of
the federal judiciary, one must' refer to the guidelines of Baker v.
Carr. There the Court reaffirmed the historic dogma that federal
courts cannot decide "political questions. '24  A political question
was said to be presented: (1) when there is a lack of "judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards" for resolving an issue,25 or (2)
when it cannot be decided without "an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion."26
21 See, e.g., Thigpen v. Meyers, supra note 16, at 832; Mann v. Davis, sura note
16, at 585; Dixon, supra note 10, at 391; Emerson, supra note 10, at 76.
18 225 F. Supp. at 651, 655-56. See Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine
of Judicial Intervention and Its Implications for American Federalism, 29 U. Cm. L.
REv. 673, 690 (1962); Lucas, Of Ducks and Drakes: Judicial Relief in Reapportionment
Cases, 38 NoTRE DAmFt LAW. 401, 411-14 (1963).
29 See Dixon, supra note 10, at 388; Emerson, supra note 10, at 77. But see Bickel,
The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 44-45 (1962); Lucas, supra
note 18, at 413-14.
20 In the words of Professor Neal, "courts have granted such relief with an almost
complete lack of concern about the foundations of their authority." Neal, Politics in
Search of Law, 1962 Sup. CT. R v. 252, 327. See Krastin, The Implementation of
Representative Government in a Democracy, 48 IowA L. Rnv. 549, 570-71 (1963);
McCloskey, supra note 10, at 67-70.2 1 See note 2 supra.
22 See Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrove v.
Green, 72 YALE L.J. 13, 14-16 (1962); Krastin, supra note 20, at 569-71; McCloskey,
supra note 10, at 60, 67-70; Neal, supra note 20, at 327.
28 See Dixon, supra note 10, at 390-97; Friedelbaum, supra note 18, at 699-700;
Katzenbach, Some Reflections on Baker v. Carr, 15 VAND. L. REv. 829 (1962); Krastin,
supra note 20, at 569; Lucas, supra note 18, at 407-14; Comment, supra note 8, at
1035-38.
21369 U.S. at 210-17. See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 807 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939);
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 7-11 (1849).
25 369 U.S. at 217.
26 Ibid. A political question also exists when there is "found a textually demon-
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In light of these two tests, the validity of several remedies which
have been utilized by lower federal courts becomes questionable. In
Oklahoma, the court relocated existing district'lines; 27 in Tennessee,
the federal judiciary "consolidated" overrepresented districts and
awarded the extra legislators to underrepresented areas;28 and in
Alabama, the court combined parts of two unconstitutional legisla-
tive proposals.29 All of these remedies necessitated the judicial al-
teration or obliteration of existing districts.
The division of a state into legislative districts is the accepted
mode of implementing representative government in the United
States.s° However, the fourteenth amendment requires such division
to be based, at the very least, upon some rational state policy.31
Even if this requires nothing less than equal population among
districts, 2 there still exists a wide variety of possibilities by which
districting may be accomplished.33 These plans, most of which are
constitutionally apportioned, 4 will materially differ with respect to
the representation of certain political, social and economic interests,
depending upon whether a faction is accorded or denied majority
voting power within a particular district. Any decision, therefore,
must ultimafely reflect policy determinations which may totally deny
a legislative voice to specific local interests.3 5 Consequently, it is
strable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department."
Ibid. This means the federal judiciary cannot decide an issue whose ultimate resolu-
tion is delegated to either the legislative or executive branch of the federal government.
27 Moss v. Burkhardt, 220 F. Supp. 149, 155 (W.D. Okla. 1963), 49 VA. L. Rav. 1209.
The court expressed considerable doubt as to its constitutional power to redistrict.
220 F. Supp. at 155.
21 Baker v. Carr, 222 F. Supp. 684, 693-94 (M.D. Tenn. 1968). This remedy was
explicitly suggested in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Clark in Baker. 869 U.S.
at 260.
20 Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431, 441-42 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
8 See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 10, at 397; Sindler, supra note 10, at 29.
81 Baker v. Carr, 269 U.S. at 258-58 (Clark, J., concurring).
88 Apportionment based solely upon population has been required for the election
of representatives to the Federal House of Representatives. Wesberry v. Sanders, 32
U.S.L. WEEK 4142 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1964) (decided on the basis of U.S. CoNST. art. I § 2).
See also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1968). Although these cases left the problem of
state legislative apportionment unresolved, it is not inconceivable that the Court may
apply the same standard. See Gray v. Sanders, supra at 381.
8 Black, supra note 22, at 15-16.
3, A few plans consistent with the concept of equal population may be unconstitu-
tional with respect to other nonapportionment factors. See, e.g., Wright v. Rockefeller,
32 U.S.L. WEEK 4157 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1964) (racial gerrymandering).
5 "A value determination is inevitably made by the adoption of any 'system' for
establishing district boundaries.... [T]he gerrymander can be, and in some instances
imperceptibly so, negative as well as affirmative." Krastin, supra note 20, at 570. See
Black, supra note 22, at 15. If the federal courts are to select one of several possible
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clear that "redistricting" presents a political question because the
judiciary possesses no standards by which such policy judgments can
be purposively or arbitrarily made.36
The Tennessee remedy of "consolidating" overrepresented dis-
tricts37 presents identical problems. This process of erasing certain
district lines does not obviate the necessity of judicially determining
whether district A is to be combined with district B, C, or D. Al-
though masquerading as an expression of legislative choice, the
Alabama remedy38 of combining fragments of different legislative
proposals is also objectionable.3 9 To -the extent that this patchwork
reapportionment does not adopt any legislative scheme in its en-
tirety, it is nothing more than judicial picking and choosing. Thus,
it seems that judicial modification of existing district lines should be
precluded by the Baker definition of political questions.
Certain remedies, however, may not present political questions.
These include the at large election, the writ of mandamus, the
adoption of a prior legislative apportionment, increasing the size of
a legislature, and the weighted vote. To be "appropriate," however,
a remedy must be practical as well as constitutional. Thus the
remedy must be: (1) susceptible of application without placing an
undue burden upon the electorate or the state; and (2) endowed
plans, they cannot avoid the situation posed by Mr. Justice Clark: "The federal
courts are of course not forums for political debate, nor should they resolve themselves
into state constitutional conventions or legislative assemblies." Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. at 259-60.
36Neal, supra note 20, at 327; see Black, supra note 22, at 15-16; Dixon, supra
note 10, at 369-70, 389; McCloskey, supra note 10, at 67-70; cf. Bickel, supra note 19, at
4445. Contra, Cox, Current Constitutional Issues, 48 A.B.A.J. 711, 713 (1962);
McKay, supra note 8, at 703; Comment, supra note 8, at 1039-40. Notably, the
Oklahoma court failed to articulate what standards it employed in relocating districts.
Moss v. Burkhardt, 220 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
87 Baker v. Carr, 222 F. Supp. 684, 693-94 (M.D. Tenn. 1963).
38 Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431, 441-42 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
9 See Dixon, supra note 10, at 392. But see McKay, supra note 8, at 703. The
Alabama remedy is also defective as a general form of relief in that the requisite bases
(alternative legislative proposals) rarely exist and could be easily avoided by a
teluctant legislature.
The court argued in Sims, that the remedy need only apply for the limited purpose
.of permitting the legislature to reapportion itself. Sims v. Frink, supra note 38, at
441-42. While this argument might cure a remedy with practical defects, it is
.unacceptable in the context of an unconstitutional remedy. The basic objection to
judicial redistricting is the necessity of effectuating underlying policy decisions.
'Thus, to apply such a remedy for even a temporary period is to neglect the considera-
,tion that interim representative interests will determine the composition of the




with the potential of ultimately providing adequate relief from the
deprivation of constitutional rights.
The at large election of all representatives to the state legislature
fails to meet the first requirement. It is possible, for example, that
the Washington legislature will be elected at large in the near
future.40 Should this materialize, every voter would be presented
with a ballot listing between sixteen hundred and three thousand
candidates.41 Moreover, as applied to a state legislature, it would
appear that this remedy also presents a political question. Since an
at large election effectuates only statewide majority interests, it may
effectively deny a legislative voice to certain minority groups pre-
viously represented.42
A use of the writ of mandamus against one or all functions of the
state government is nullified as an appropriate judicial remedy by a
number of considerations. Prominent among these are the difficulty
of enforcement4 3 and the fact that imprisoning reluctant legislators
for contempt is not a satisfactory solution to the fundamental prob-
lem of reapportionment.
Likewise, the adoption of some antecedent apportionment act
under the "relation back" theory is patently impractical. Even as-
suming that a state. possesses a prior act consistent with the require-
40 Thigpen v. Meyers, 211 F. Supp. 826, 832 (W.D. Wash. 1962).
"252 NAT'L CIvic REv. 325 (1963).
"2 As one author has stated, elections at large "would be tossing the representation
baby out with the equal protection bath." Dixon, supra note 10, at 394. Lisco v.
Love, 219 F. Supp. 922, 925 (D. Colo. 1963); Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 209 F. Supp.
183, 188 (W.D. Wis. 1962); Black, supra note 22, at 15; Krastin, supra note 20, at 569;
Comment, supra note 8, at 1037-38; see Friedelbaum, supra note 18, at 690. Contra,
League of Neb. Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189, 195 (D. Neb. 1962); Cox,
supra note 36, at 713; McKay, supra note 8, at 705; see Emerson, supra note 10, at 77;
Katzenbach, supra note 23, at 835.
The Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of at large elections in lieu of federal
congressional districts. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 374-75 (1932); Carroll v. Becker,
285 U.S. 380, 382 (1932). However, the at large election is a less cumbersome device
in the case of electing a few representatives to Congress as opposed to electing an
entire state legislature. The latter would also necessitate disregarding state constitu-
tional provisions requiring election by districts.
" The sorry history of Virginia v. West Virginia would seem sufficient to condemn
federal mandamus against a legislature as an appropriate remedy. 246 U.S. 565 (1918).
Black, supra note 22, at 15; Lucas, supra note 18, at 401-05, 407-09. But see Friedel-
baum, sura note 18, at 699, 701-02; McKay, supra note 8, at 704-05.
In every state except Alaska, apportionment is a duty delegated to the legislature;
mandamus directed to the state judiciary or executive would therefore require
action in violation of the state's separation of powers. Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d
296, 303 (R.I. 1962); Lucas, supra note 18, at 406-07; see Radford v. Gary, 145 F. Supp.
541, 542-44 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 991 (1956).
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ments of equal protection, outdated apportionment plans seldom
reflect the needs of contemporary political society.44
The simple addition of legislators to underrepresented districts
does not present a political question, for it does not require a judicial
determination that will deny a legislative voice to existing repre-
sented interests. It merely equalizes the voting power of currently
represented interests by refrence to some ascertainable standard, such
as population within comparative districts. In most cases, however,
this remedy would place an undue burden upon the legislative
process. In most malapportioned states, a substantial increase in the
size of a legislature would be required to provide adequate relief.8
The weighted vote is one form of relief which may be deemed
"appropriate" because it responds to practical considerations without
presenting a political question. Under this procedure, the legislator
from an underrepresented district is entitled to cast a greater number
of votes than his colleagues from over-represented districts. Critics
of this system have urged that as a matter of legislative procedure,
it would be difficult to allocate committee memberships and speak-
ing time on the basis of weighted votes. 46 Voice votes and quorum
calls would be more time consuming. However, these are long-term
procedural problems of a speculative nature47 They would be ob-
viated if the weighted vote were applied for the transitory purpose
of voting on the reapportionment issue. As a temporary measure, it
provides a precise means of constitutional apportionment in con-
formance with existing districts, while at the same time releasing
the legislature from its "strait jacket" with respect to the reappor-
tionment problem.
4' Davis v. Synhorst, 225 F. Supp. 689, 691 (S.D. Iowa 1964); see Comment, supra
note 8, at 1035-56. But see Davis v. Synhorst, 217 F. Supp. 492, 509 (S.D. Iowa 1963)
(dissenting opinion). There is also the objection that current statutes constitute an
express legislative rejection of prior apportionment schemes. Mann v. Davis, 213
F. Supp. 577, 585 (E.D. Va. 1962).
" Another objection is the likely possibility of conflict with a maximum membership
clause of the state constitution. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2.
4o Dixon, supra note 10, at 394; Comment, supra note 8, at 1036.
'
7 One court has refused to consider the weighted vote because it may contain
"unknown evils." League of Neb. Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189, 195
(D. Neb. 1962). On the other hand, several authors have intimated that weighted
voting would be appropriate even as a permanent remedy. Cormack, Baaker v. Carr
and Minority Government in the United States, 8 Whi. & MARY L. REv. 282, 283
(1962); see Emerson, supra note 10, at 77; Katzenbach, supra note 23, at 835. Upon
the recommendation of political scientists, the New Mexico legislature recently adopted
weighted voting as a permanent means of correcting its malapportioned house of
representatives. 53 NAT'L Cvic REv. 35 (1964).
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The Hearne decision is correct in that some judicial remedies
designed to supplement a prohibitive injunction are not within the
realm of judicial competence. Other remedies not expressly con-
sidered by the court are defective for practical reasons. But in er-
roneously concluding there is no appropriate remedy, Hearne failed
to recognize that a limited use of the weighted vote may be easily
,applied in any state without practical or constitutional objection.*
* After this casenote went to press, the United States Supreme Court decided
Sims v. Frink, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4535 (U.S. June 15, 1964). This case settles the ques-
tion of constitutional standards. See notes 8 & 32, supra. While the Court did not reach
the issue of appropriate judicial remedies generally, it did approve the Alabama
apportionment plan discussed at 615-16, supra. 32 U.S.L. W= at 4549-50.
